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Businesses  are  coordinated  organizations,  and  cooperation  among  employees  reduces  over-
all  organizational  costs.  Understanding  how  important  cooperation  is  among  different
cultures  is important,  as  business  becomes  increasingly  global.  However,  cross-cultural
literature  on  cooperation  deals  with  firm  alliances,  joint  ventures,  and  other  firm  inter-
relationships,  but  not  on societal  differences  in  cooperation.  Is cooperation  similar  across
cultures? Using  proxies,  this  study  sought  to operationalize  cooperation  and  examine  its
underpinnings  in  countries,  using  the  cultural  dimensions  of  individualism  and  power  dis-
tance.  Although  the  initial  hypotheses  stated  that  cooperation  would  look  different  across
these dimensions,  the international  set  of 6452  respondents  showed  that  the overwhelm-
ing  majority  had  a  similar  view  of  cooperation.  The  study  adds  to our  understanding  of
cooperation  in  different  societies  and  contexts,  and  suggests  that  there  may  be  a universal
view of  cooperation  across  cultures.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Cross-cultural of cooperation at the individual level
Businesses have been defined as coordinated organizations, dependent upon cooperation of employees (Barnard, 1938).
The need to work toward “promotively interdependent goals” (Deutsch, 1949:132) requires that firms understand how
to capture and build cooperation. Roberts (2006) and Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) identified cooperation as a
probative workplace trait, essential for workplace survival (Avolio & Luthans, 2006; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Organizations
with highly interdependent tasks foster the need for cooperation as they try to move from local to global functioning, often
using such things as virtual teams (Allred, Snow, & Miles, 1996).
Kerr (1975) argued that organizations cannot depend on chance cooperation. Borman and Motowidlo (1993) stated that
the reduction in communication barriers during cooperation reduces overall organizational costs. However, managers must
convince employees that cooperation is important by emphasizing the need to achieve a common goal for a common benefit
(Barnard, 1938). Although this literature is not recent, it is worth reviewing for its current application in modern global
organizations. Since the initial work in this area, few have examined cooperation across cultures in terms of individual
preferences or reactions. Much has been limited to firm networks, joint ventures, or strategic alliances (cf., Contractor &
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Lorange, 2002; Holm, Eriksson, & Johnson, 1996; Park & Russo, 1996; Sattler, Schrader, & Luthje, 2003; Wilkinson & Young,
2001).
And as many have discussed, it is crucial to understand those functioning in different societies and contexts as the
workforce becomes global (cf., Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston, & Triandis, 2002; Motowidlo & Schmit, 1999). Cultural dimensions
are so much more than individual determinants of behavior; they also influence how people interact within organizational
settings (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 2000). When cultures and firms intertwine, interesting dynamics are likely to result.
The research question examined in this study is whether cooperation can be operationalized through proxies (i.e., concrete
measures representing cooperation) in the same manner in cultures with various cultural dimension ratings (Hofstede,
2001), specifically in terms of individualism and power distance. The direct outcome of this proxy would indicate whether
there is truly a difference in the value of cooperation across cultures with various ratings of individualism and power distance.
1.2. Overview of cooperation research
Cooperation is essential, because organizational goals are only achieved when members cooperate to reach them. The
form of cooperation may  be deliberate or accidental, kind or contentious, but cooperation exists or the organization cannot
(Barnard, 1938). Roberts (2006) and Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) identified cooperation as a positive workplace
trait, especially important as exceptional performance becomes increasingly necessary for workplace survival (Avolio &
Luthans, 2006; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003). Therefore, organizations with highly interdependent tasks foster the need for
cooperation.
Cooperation often requires incentives, as self-interested individuals are more likely to cooperate when rewards result
(Kerr, 1975; Smith, 1776/1991). However, many researchers view cooperation as a socialization of values that induces
compliance with social norms (cf., Durkheim, 1938). If cooperation is a social norm in a society, then members will be
socialized into cooperative behaviors. Deutsch (1949) found that, in general terms, people readily cooperation if (a) they see
that their goals are interrelated and (b) cooperation will help them achieve them.
Deutsch (1949),  Durkheim (1938),  and Smith (1776/1991) saw cooperation in a broad sense, across different organizations
and societal structures in the West. However, from a social exchange perspective (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974), based on
research in Western societies, cooperation is based on reciprocity (Fehr & Gintis, 2007; Gouldner, 1960). In other words,
cooperation by one person creates an expectation of cooperation by the other (Koster & Sanders, 2006).
Individuals also make sacrifices to punish those who  violate norms as to the appropriateness of the exchanges (Fehr
& Gintis, 2007). Studies in the West show that, when punishment opportunities are given, cooperation rates increase,
sometimes to 100 percent (Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992; Yamagishi, 1986). If there are
costs to self-interested behaviors, then individuals are more likely to reciprocate (Anderson & Putterman, 2006; Carpenter,
2007).
Cooperation has been found to be an important component in organizational behavior research in organizations. Indi-
vidual cooperation in work activities has been shown to increase organizational loyalty (Hage, 1980; Hirschman, 1970) and
improve organizational commitment (Mowday, Steers, & Porter, 1982). Research also defines cooperation as a main part
of contextual performance or organizational citizenship behaviors (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; LePine & Van Dyne, 2001;
Organ, 1997; Van Dyne et al., 1995) and prosocial organizational behavior (Koster & Sanders, 2006). The most frequently
studied form of cooperative behavior is contextual performance or organizational citizenship behaviors (Koster & Sanders,
2006; Van Scotter, Motowidlo, & Cross, 2000), with the majority of work done in Western societies. Contextual performance
has, at its root, the idea that individuals will help each other and work together to achieve organizational goals.
In the West, excellent performers, those whose work regularly exceeds the average, use cooperation as a useful strategy
more often than do moderate performers (Sonnentag, 2000). Sonnentag also found that peers use cooperation as a measure
of competency when describing excellent performers (Ericsson & Charness, 1994). This is important in organizations relying
more on teamwork and other cooperative arrangements (Stevens & Campion, 1994; West, Borrill, & Unsworth, 1998). There-
fore, organizations with highly interdependent tasks have attempted to foster cooperation as they move from individualized
work to team work (Allred et al., 1996) and from local to global functioning.
1.3. Cultural dimensions relevant to the current study
Individuals living in various areas of the world have different orientations to their environments, resulting in different
approaches to dealing with local geographical, political, and economic situations (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1996). Culture
consists of the norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes of a group of people, and often the definition includes traditional practices.
It is thought to be a reaction to environmental situations (cf., Hofstede, 2001; Kluckhohn, 1954). Although the multitude
of definitions and dimensions of culture are breathtaking, most indicate that elements are shared within each culture (cf.,
Hofstede, 2001; Kluckhohn, 1954; Skinner, 1981; Shweder & LeVine, 1984), including ways of “perceiving, believing, evalu-
ating, communicating, and acting” (Triandis, 1996: 408). Culture often appears to be virtually seamless – not requiring much
conscious thought to incorporate the norms, values, and attitudes into behaviors. In this study, we will employ the cultural
dimensions of individualism and power distance to determine whether there is truly a difference in the value of cooperation
across cultures. Culture is self-construal, “a constellation of thoughts, feelings, and actions concerning the relation of the self
to others and the self as distinct from others” (Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Yiu Lai, 1999:316). The self is defined as indepen-
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dent in societies where individualism is the dominant societal cultural value; the self is defined as interdependent where its
opposite, collectivism, is the dominant societal cultural value (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). As a result, those in individualistic
societies define personal goals as more important than group goals; the opposite is true in collectivistic societies (Schwartz,
1990, 1992, 1994; Triandis, 1988, 1990). Non-Western societies tend to be more collectivistic in behavior (Hofstede, 2001)
– and 70 percent of the population lives in non-Western societies (Triandis, 1995)! Scholars have examined many different
cultural dimensions, but the most prominent has been individualism (cf., Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995).
Power distance, as a cultural dimension is the acceptance and expectation of inequalities which are basically hierarchical
or resource differences (Hofstede, 2001). Individuals in higher power distance cultures often do not question statements of
those in power (Yang, Mossholder, & Peng, 2007). Organizations in higher power distance cultures often reflect this by having
strict hierarchies and communication channels, with little visible input into decision making by lower ranking members.
Organizations in higher power distance cultures are more likely to use hierarchy as a guide, rather than a rule. In these
cultures, structures are often flat, and participative decision making has become a desirable trait (Hofstede, 2001). Singelis
et al. (1995) and Triandis and Gelfand (1998) stated that power distance may  covary with individualism/collectivism in
many studies, making it difficult to distinguish between the two.
In the work of Singelis et al. (1995),  a promising measurement instrument was promoted to measure horizontal and
vertical individualism and collectivism. The research indicated that there is a tight matrix structure among the students
surveyed in the pilot study. However, no other studies showing international reliability were found.
The two dimensions of individualism and power distance were chosen because of the frequency of their use and their
salience in most of the business literature. In exploring these two dimensions, we do not mean to indicate that the other
dimensions would not be of value, but instead that these two  appear to be of particular value in the business communities
that are interested in topics such as cooperation.
1.4. Cooperation and cultural dimensions
Cooperation emphasizes group accomplishments, so it is generally considered to be a collectivistic trait (Chatman, Polzer,
Barsade, & Neale, 1998). Variations in individualism are suspected to influence cooperation (Wagner, 1995), and this study
seeks to determine whether power distance does as well. We  have been unable to uncover prior research on this point. Many
researchers speculate that, since cooperation diminishes personal resources that could be used to achieve personal goals,
those in individualistic cultures would be more likely to avoid cooperation (Spence, 1985; Wagner, 1995). Earley (1989,
1993), Gabrenya, Latane, and Wang (1983),  Hsu (1970),  and Yang (1981) found collectivist group cooperation, although they
did not measure the underlying structure. Wagner and Moch (1986) found that individualists may  ignore groups if the goals
conflict with personal desires, while collectivists may  ignore their own personal desires to achieve group goals.
Similarity of values often fosters cooperation, as does similarities of status and social ties (Triandis, 2000). These similar-
ities are strong in collectivistic ingroups and often lead to higher levels of cooperation than those found in individualistic
ingroups (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 2000). Collectivists, by definition, have fewer and tighter ingroups than do individualists
(Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 2000). Helping others is a requirement of membership in collectivistic culture ingroups, creat-
ing focus and identity for the group (Moorman & Blakely, 1995; Paine & Organ, 2000). Therefore, this study is built on the
supposition that those in collectivistic cultures would value cooperation more than would those in individualistic cultures.
Power distance would also seem to be a potential factor in cooperation and its value within different cultures. Because
of the acceptance of inequalities in higher power distance cultures, group members would be expected to cooperate with
those in power over them; however, those in lower power distance cultures might not feel the same pressures to comply.
1.5. Purpose and hypotheses of the study
The purpose of the study was twofold. The first is to determine whether cooperation can be operationalized through
proxies in the same manner in cultures with various cultural dimension ratings (Hofstede, 2001). The work within this study
is, therefore, to determine the cultural equivalence of the measure across cultures, using statistical validation methods.
The direct outcome of this proxy would indicate whether there is truly a difference in the value of cooperation across
cultures with various ratings of individualism and power distance. Two hypotheses are posited from the review of the current
literature:
(1) Cooperation will be more valued in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures.
(2) Cooperation will be more valued in high power distance cultures than in individualistic cultures.
2. Method
2.1. Sample and procedure
A total of 6452 respondents working in various organizations in sixteen different countries participated in the study. The
respondents were each born and held citizenship in their respective countries, listed alphabetically in Table 1, along with the
demographic data for the overall set and each country. The respondents were each employed in various industries, rather
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Table  1
Demographic and other data for sample.
Countries Individualism
Index/Power
Distance Indexa
Number of
respondents
Age Sexb Occupationc Cronbach’s d
1 Australia 90/36 744 37 42.9 M
56.7 F
Retail 42.0
Health 33.1
.760
2 Canada 80/39 122 43 14.2 M
85.8 F
Health 100 .694
3  Chile 23/63 588 40 44.5 M
54.5 F
Finan 39.9
Health 35.4
Govt. 24.7
.686
4  France 71/68 93 37 43.0 M
57.0 F
Manuf 40.9
Educ 16.1
Finan 11.8
.641
5  Germany 67/35 256 38 51.2 M
48.8 F
Manuf 25.4
Health 17.2
Retail 10.5
Finan 10.2
.717
6  India 48/77 458 36 26.0 M
28.6 F
Health 54.6
Finan 45.4
.672
7  Lithuania 50/45e 199 41 15.1 M
79.9 F
Health 100 .754
8  Malaysia 26/104 111 – 64.9M
35.1 F
Manuf 100 .827
9  Poland 60/68 248 41 57.7 M
42.3 F
Manuf 46.4
Retail 25.4
Govt 10.5
.606
10  PRC 20/80 240 36 68.6 M
31.4 F
Manuf 96.8 .692
11  S. Korea 18/60 271 32 26.9 M
72.7 F
Health 100 .773
12  Taiwan 17/58 220 34 10.9 M
87.7 F
Health 100 .773
13  Turkey 37/66 1567 32 32.5 M
67.1 F
Health 100 .721
14  United Arab
Emirates
38f/80g 237 33 61.4 M
36.9 F
IT 25.8
Health 21.6
Finan 16.1
Manuf 16.1
Support 10.2
.803
15 United States 91/40 589 32 39.4 M
59.6 F
Health 43.6
Manuf 18.4
.740
16  Venezuela 12/81 509 37 64.4 M
35.8 F
Manuf 60.9
Health 38.7
.740
Total  World averagesa
Individualism-43
power distance-55
6452 35 42 M
58 F
Occupationc health
56.2
Manuf 18.8
.777
a From Hofstede (2001) and http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede dimensions.php).
b Percentage of respondents.
c Percentage of major occupations listed (≥10%).
d Cronbach’s alpha (scale reliabilities) for each country for the scale comprising the Cooperation Index. Note: None showed significantly improved
reliability if one or more questions are deleted.
e “Arab World” = Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia (http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede dimensions.php).
f Total number responding to the survey instrument.
g Mockaitis (2002, 2005).
than a student population. As suggested in Bhagat and McQuaid (1982) and Bhagat and Moustafa (2002),  the instrument was
translated in countries where the business language was  not English, at the direction of country collaborator, with checks
through back-translation for fidelity to the original instrument.
2.2. Measures
2.2.1. Measure of country culture
This study is built on Hofstede’s (1981, 2001) analyses of country culture for the individualism and power distance
dimensions, whose link between country and culture has been accepted in the mainstream cross-cultural organizational
behavior literature, as discussed previously.
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Table 2
Factor analysis from each country.
Country Percent of variance
explained by 1st factor
Eigenvalues for factor 1a
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Total data set 52.981 .722 .727 .749 .745 .695
Australia 51.294 .744 .669 .706 .767 .691
Canada 53.121 .726 .772 .832 .778 .486
Chile  45.032 .629 .653 .711 .719 .637
France 42.821 .771 .596 .723 .726
Germany 48.608 .791 .614 .679 .789 .586
India 43.486 .650 .620 .673 .695 .657
Lithuania 50.647 .742 .747 .737 .668 .659
Malaysia 59.216 .732 .780 .812 .782 .739
Poland 39.200 .590 .566 .697 .652 .617
People’s Republic of China 44.890 .688 .613 .663 .713 .668
S.  Korea 52.608 .746 .675 .759 .744 .699
Taiwan 52.818 .629 .795 .711 .782 .703
Turkey  47.349 .640 .710 .701 .701 .687
United  Arab Emirates 65.830 .834 .748 .836 .818 .817
United  States 56.113 .775 .722 .791 .726 .728
Venezuela 49.272 .720 .724 .702 .693 .669
a Extraction using principal component analysis.
2.2.2. Measure of cooperation
The measure of cooperation consists of five statements providing a measure of individual attitudes toward cooperation,
measured using a Likert scale (1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree). There was a cohesive scale with excellent face
validity for use in measurement. These statements are:
(1) The well-being of my  coworkers is important to me;
(2) If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud;
(3) I feel good when I cooperate with others;
(4) It is important to me  that I respect decisions made by my  groups; and
(5) I respect the majority’s wishes in groups of which I am a member.
The survey is adapted on the work of Singelis et al. (1995),  Triandis and Gelfand (1998),  and Triandis (2002).  We  analyzed
the entire survey used by Singelis et al. (1995),  but there was  no identifiable matrix structure and poor reliabilities in the
international sample, except for the five questions noted above. We  found this to be of interest, and pursued the cooperation
perspective, as it is a critical ingredient of business effectiveness in cross-cultural management.
2.3. Data analysis
Data were analyzed with SPSS 17.0. Initially, factor analysis was undertaken to determine if there was  indeed a single factor
structure. To determine whether there was cross-cultural equivalence of the scale, Levine’s test of homogeneity of variances
was performed. One-way ANOVA with Welch test were used to assess differences in scores between the country/cultural
groups on the variable.
3. Results
3.1. Cross-cultural equivalency
Before assuming that scales developed in one country are suitable for another, cross-cultural equivalency is determined.
This has been a significant difficulty in cross-cultural empirical studies. Using Vandenberg and Lance’s (2000) suggestions,
Levine’s test of homogeneity of variances was performed, since there was a single dependent variable. Results indicated no
significant differences among the variances of the scale across cultures (p = .000). This was  taken as an excellent indication
of the cross-cultural equivalency of the scale.
3.2. Cohesion of the scale
In examining cross-cultural responses to the scale, factor analysis was  used. Principle component analysis without rota-
tion showed a single factor matrix structure for the entire data set, as shown in Table 2. Results showed that one factor
explains 52.981 percent of the variance and, when eigenvalues below .4 are suppressed, one factor emerges. The reliability
of the scale was also tested, using the entire data set, and Cronbach’s alpha was  .777 for the five items, with no improvement
if items were removed.
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Table  3
Cooperation scores.
Country Cooperation
indexa
Percentage
respondentsb
Standard
deviation
Australia 5.51 99.6 .875
Canada  5.56 100 .862
Chile 6.28  99.3 .686
France 5.05 98.9 .942
Germany 5.17 100 .863
India  5.91 100 .716
Lithuania 5.24 100 .944
Malaysia 5.35 100 .762
Poland  5.63 100 .753
People’s Republic of China 5.14 100 .789
S.  Korea 5.14 100 .774
Taiwan  5.60 100 .807
Turkey  5.95 99.6 .917
United  Arab Emirates 5.60 99.6 1.125
United  States 5.50 100 .923
Venezuela 6.22 100 .828
Total  5.80 99.6 .885
a Cooperation index = summated mean score for country (taking all respondents answering 4 or more of the five questions, i.e., 70 percent).
b Percentage of total country respondents answering 4 of 5 cooperation items.
3.3. Country data
There was no significant different attributable to age, gender, or industry group. ANOVA for the entire data set (Between
Groups: Sum of Squares = 792.385; df = 15; F = 79.908; p = .000) demonstrates that there is no significant statistical variation
between country respondent means. Welch test (p = .00) indicates that there are no statistically different responses between
the country respondent means.
Factor analysis was performed for each country group of responses. As shown in Table 2, we  found a good factor matrix
structure for each country, reflected in the factor structure for the entire dataset. Most of the countries had one major
component, when eigenvalues less than .4 were suppressed. We  also examined the reliability of the scale for each country,
and Cronbach’s alphas are given in Table 1. For each country, the alpha values is above the  ˛ = .6 suggested for reliability in
many cross-cultural papers, with most near or above the ˛ = .7 recommended for studies within the same culture (Nunnally,
1978; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000).
Creating a mean Cooperation Index for each of the 6452 respondents was  performed using a reductive method: Respon-
dents must answer at least four of the five items (70 percent) before their responses can be used in the remaining analyses.
Of the total respondents, 6423 (99.6 percent) answered four of the five items. An individual mean score of 1 indicated the
lowest importance given to cooperation, while a score of 7 indicated the highest. With statistical validity and reliability, face
validity, and content validity of the entire data set established, further analysis by country was  undertaken.
The distributions of country means overlap, ranging from a mean of 5.05 (France) with a standard deviation of .942, to a
mean of 6.28 (Chile) with a standard deviation of .686 on the 7 point scale. As shown in Table 3 and Fig. 1, the lowest average
country mean is above the midpoint of the scale (4). This indicates that the majority of the respondents surveyed in each
country believed that cooperation was important. Analyzing the small differences between countries is counterproductive
and could lead to an oversimplification.
Table 1 shows the Individualism Index and Power Distance Index of different countries, based on Hofstede (2001) scores.
We had thought to divide the countries, based on their Individualism Index and Power Distance Index, into high, low, and
medium individualistic and power distance groups and analyze the data based on these divisions. At this point, correlation
analysis was performed using the Individualism and Power Distance Indexes and the newly developed Cooperation Index of
this study (−0.182, p = .000; .157, p = .000, respectively). In neither case was there a strong or significant correlation between
cooperation and cultural dimension of the study (Fig. 2).
4. Discussion and conclusions
The multicultural data set of 6452 respondents indicated that there is an interrelationship of five questions that involve
the concept of cooperation. Our first hypothesis proposed an inverse relationship, i.e., the lower the Individualism Index, the
higher the mean on the Cooperation Index. Our second proposed a direct relationship, i.e., the higher the Power Distance
Index, the higher the mean on the Cooperation Index. Our data shows that an individual’s attitude toward cooperation is
not a function of either index. Whether a person lives in an individualistic or collectivistic country or whether the power
distance is high or low, the understanding and agreement as to the importance of cooperation was similar. It would seem
that cooperation is not a function of these particular cultural dimensions. The correlation of cooperation and power distance
Author's personal copy
244 K.M. Leonard et al. / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36 (2012) 238– 247
Fig. 1. Frequency of totaled responses to cooperation questions.
Fig. 2. Cooperation index means for countries.
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Table  4
Pearson’s correlation analysis.
Cooperation
index
Hofstede Individualism
Index
Hofstede Power
Distance Index
Cooperation index Pearson’s correlation 1
P  value
N  6423
Hofstede Individualism Index Pearson’s correlation −.182** 1
P  value .000
N  6224 6253
Hofstede Power Distance Index Pearson’s correlation .157** −.787** 1
P  value .000 .000
N  6224 6253 6253
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
is interesting, and we plan further studies to determine the nature of the correlation, which was not reflected in the way
that individuals perceive cooperation (Table 4).
Our data shows no statistically significant differences in the means; therefore, we  can see that cooperation at work is
strongly valued among all cultures. Therefore, we can strongly suggest that, even if two groups of people have different
languages and cultures, the can cooperate using a similar basis of understanding of what cooperation entails. We  were
somewhat surprised to find that little empirical work had been done using cooperative behaviors across cultures. In analyzing
the multinational data, we hope to have an impact on the theoretical view of cross-cultural cooperation.
As globalization increases exponentially with unforeseen technological and economic changes, it is crucial to understand
those who function in different societies. We  often make false assumptions about the “West,” assuming that individuals
in these countries are similar and that each person has an individualistic outlook (Hofstede, 2001). We  understand the
dynamic between the knowledge developed in the West and considered “universal” (Prasad, 1997) and “native knowledge”
from elsewhere (Banerjee, 2000; Banerjee & Linstead, 2001; Said, 1981; waThiong’o, 1981, 2006).
In looking at our data, cooperation appears the same, but there are some striking differences that might affect indi-
viduals differently. For example, one approach to human relations, called the investment approach (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, &
Tripli, 1997) indicates that more contextual performance, including cooperation, occurs when employees perceive that the
employer is investing in them. Other research indicates that supervisors who are cooperative toward employees are likely
to receive cooperation in return (Koster & Sanders, 2006), and this is a likely affect among peers as well (Bommer, Miles, &
Grover, 2003).
Our primary factor, cooperation, is the subject of this paper, and we hope this provides new and useful information for
the discussion and analysis of the concept. Given the differences between individualist and collectivist societies, it is likely
that the reasons for cooperation might be different, which is an interesting idea, but beyond the scope of this paper. We
suggest that there is much benefit in examining cross-cultural cooperation, because of its importance in the future, as we
turn from individualized work structures in a single cultural environment to teamwork in a global context.
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